

Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises^{1,2}

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Abstract

The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the ‘wisdom of crowds’. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises – voter independence – is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem’s misleading conclusion that ‘large crowds are infallible’. We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, ‘large crowds are fallible but better than small groups’. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation and education, which appear inessential in the classical jury framework. Our theorem is related to Ladha’s (1993) seminal jury theorem for interchangeable (‘indistinguishable’) voters based on de Finetti’s Theorem. We also prove a more general and simpler such jury theorem.

The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) looks back on a remarkable career. Discovered by Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, in 1785, first proved formally by Laplace in 1812 (Ben-Yashar & Paroush 2007, 190), then long forgotten and finally rediscovered by Duncan Black (Black 1958, Grofman & Feld 1988), the CJT has now taken centre stage in epistemic conceptions of democracy and in debates in social epistemology. Propelled by claims in the popular literature that crowds can be ‘wise’ (Surowiecki 2004) and mobs ‘smart’ (Rheingold 2002), the CJT is now again widely

¹Kai Spiekermann would like to emphasize that the formal results in this paper are the work of Franz Dietrich.

²Helpful comments were gratefully received from anonymous referees and the editor. We also particularly thank Christian List for providing very useful feedback. We further benefited from many great comments received from audiences at occasions where this paper was presented, including the *LSE Choice Group Seminar* (LSE, U.K., October 2010), the *Judgment Aggregation Workshop* (CERSES & IHPST & HEC, Paris, France, January 2011), the conference *The Epistemic Life of Groups* (Institute of Philosophy, London, U.K., March 2011), the ECPR Joint Session workshop *Frontiers of Deliberation* (St. Gallen, April 2011), the *Third Rationality and Decision Network Meeting* (LSE, U.K., June 2011), the *Decisions, Games and Logic* workshop (Maastricht University, Netherlands, June 2011), the workshop *New Developments in Judgment Aggregation and Voting Theory* (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany, September 2011), and the *Microeconomics Seminar* (Hamburg University, January 2012).

discussed across various disciplines, even beyond academic circles. This career is surprising for a theorem that – in its basic form and applied naively – rests on implausible premises and leads to implausible conclusions, as we will show.

Roughly speaking, the CJT arrives at two conclusions concerning a group decision between two alternatives, where one alternative is objectively correct or better. First, the larger the group gets, the more likely is a correct majority decision. This is the CJT’s non-asymptotic conclusion. Second, the probability of a correct majority decision converges to one as the group size tends to infinity. This is the CJT’s asymptotic conclusion. Put roughly: larger groups make better decisions, and very large groups are infallible. It is worth reflecting on these results. While we think that the non-asymptotic conclusion is plausible for many setups and can be defended, the asymptotic conclusion is more than dubious. If the asymptotic conclusion applied directly to modern democracies with their large populations, these democracies would be essentially infallible when making decisions between two alternatives by simple majority.

What went wrong? The CJT rests on two central premises. Stated roughly, the first premise is that the voters vote independently from each other, and the second premise is that each voter is competent, i.e., is more likely to vote for the correct than the incorrect alternative (both premises will later be spelt out more carefully and then revised). Our negative finding is the implausibility of the premises – specifically, the independence premise – which explains the implausible asymptotic conclusion of infallible large groups. The non-asymptotic conclusion that larger groups perform better, by contrast, is plausible, but is currently relying on implausible premises and therefore left hanging without support. Our negative finding can be summed up in a table:

	Plausible?
Condorcet’s premises	No
The asymptotic conclusion	No
The non-asymptotic conclusion	Yes

Our positive finding consists in a revision of Condorcet’s premises. The new, more plausible premises lead to the new, plausible asymptotic conclusion that large groups *are* fallible. They also offer a justification for the old non-asymptotic conclusion, which previously rested on implausible premises. This will put us in a new position:

	Plausible?
The new premises	Yes
The new asymptotic conclusion	Yes
The non-asymptotic conclusion (unchanged)	Yes

The literature contains several other modifications of the original theorem. Some of them improve the theorem’s conclusions; yet they revise the premises in ways quite different from ours. We briefly review some of these proposals, and contrast them with our own approach, whose premises are philosophically transparent and defensible.

In fact, the classical CJT rests on yet another assumption, which is implicit in the classical framework: people vote sincerely. This implicit premise is no less problematic than the explicit premises. It was uncovered in the 1990ies and is being

addressed in an ongoing literature. While much progress has already been achieved along this dimension of strategic voting, the problems underlying the explicit premises – specifically, the premise of independent voting – have not yet been understood in a systematic and foundational way.

Most believe that ‘something’ is wrong with Condorcet’s premises, but confusion prevails over how best to conceptualize and solve the problem. Addressing this is important also because the new literature on strategic voting and the CJT, despite the progress over the classical CJT literature along the strategic voting dimension, still rests on the problematic independence premise (applied now to voters’ private information rather than their votes). Since the strategic voting aspect is orthogonal to the problems related to Condorcet’s explicit premises, it is not addressed in the present analysis, though a few more remarks on strategic voting will follow below.

This introduction is followed by seven sections. Section 1 begins by laying out the classical CJT as it is often cited and applied in the contemporary literature. In section 2 we show that the classical independence assumption cannot be justified and will typically be false, and propose a new, improved independence assumption. The revision of the independence assumption requires using a new competence assumption, which is provided in section 3. Section 4 contains our first positive result, a new jury theorem based on the new independence and competence assumptions. We point out that the classical CJT is nothing but a special case of our new theorem. In section 5 we highlight two important implications of the new theorem for the theory of epistemic democracy: deliberation and education may be crucial for the epistemic performance of groups, whereas the classical CJT suggests that they are inessential – since ‘crowds are infallible’ even without them – or even dangerous – since deliberation threatens voter independence. Section 6 presents our second positive result, a jury theorem for interchangeable (‘indistinguishable’) voters, generalizing Krishna Ladha’s (1993) seminal jury theorem. Section 7 draws conclusions.

1 Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Recapitulated

We begin by stating and explaining the classical CJT before criticizing its assumptions in the next sections. The first statement can be found in Condorcet (1785), a translation of most parts in Sommerlad and McLean (1989). The theorem has been stated in many variants; an influential one is provided by Grofman et al. (1983). Among the most important applications in political philosophy are Grofman and Feld’s (1988) use of the CJT to interpret Rousseau’s ‘general will’ (cf. Estlund et al. 1989) and, of course, the link between the CJT and epistemic conceptions of democracy (Cohen 1986, Gaus 1997, List and Goodin 2001, Estlund 2008). A link between the CJT, judgement aggregation and social epistemology is offered by Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and List (2005). Several important generalizations of the classical CJT have been proposed. For instance, Owen et al. (1989) prove that the asymptotic part also holds if judges are heterogeneous in competence, and Romeijn & Atkinson (2011) analyse cases of unknown competence. Different papers recognize that independence is hard to meet and/or prove jury theorems which weaken the independence assumption (e.g., Nitzan and Paroush 1984, Shapley and Grofman 1984, Boland 1989, Boland et

al. 1989, Berg 1993, Estlund 1994, Spiekermann and Goodin 2012, Kaniovski 2010).

Among the most systematic treatments of independence violations so far is the work of Ladha (1992, 1993, 1995), who shows that shared information and other common causes typically lead to correlated votes, even if the jurors do not influence each other directly. He proves new jury theorems which considerably weaken the independence assumption. In the penultimate section we show that our jury theorem is related to and can be used to generalize Ladha’s (1993) jury theorem for interchangeable voters, which draws on de Finetti’s Theorem.

Despite mathematical achievements, previous analyses of voter dependence do not tackle the conceptual core of the problem and provide little guidance for institutional design. The question of the *origin* of independence violations has remained obscure and unmodelled. For this reason the proposed independence relations are hard to interpret or justify, and their empirical plausibility is difficult to assess. Among the proposed independence relations, many seem suspicious in that they retain the implausible asymptotic conclusion (a notable exception being Ladha 1995, Proposition 4), and many seem *ad hoc* since they take the votes to be jointly distributed in certain special, mathematically convenient ways. To obtain a systematic account of voter (in)dependence, one must understand how the causal interactions in the voters’ institutional and deliberative environment create probabilistic dependence. We offer such a methodological analysis for the first time by developing a general network-theoretic account of voter dependence. It is inspired by, but significantly goes beyond Dietrich and List (2004) and Dietrich (2008), who also employ causal network reasoning but only focus on special cases of independence violations.

We now give a precise rendering of the classical CJT. Let there be a group of individuals, labelled $i = 1, 2, 3, \dots$. The size of the group (electorate) is any number n , which we assume to be odd to avoid ties under majority voting.³ The group has to decide between two alternatives, labelled 0 and 1. Exactly one of these alternatives is ‘correct’, ‘right’ or ‘better’.⁴ We will use the attribute ‘correct’ from now on. The correct alternative is called the *state (of the world)* and is typically denoted x . The state is generated by a random variable \mathbf{x} , taking the values 0 and 1, each with positive probability. Each person votes for one alternative, abstentions are not allowed. For each voter i we consider an event R_i , the event that voter i votes correctly. (Some authors take the votes rather than the correct voting events R_i as primitives of the model. This makes no difference since the votes and the correct voting events are interdefinable given the state \mathbf{x} .⁵) We write M_n for the event that a majority of an n -member electorate votes correctly.⁶

³As usual, our results can be generalized to an arbitrary group size n by assuming that ties are broken by tossing a fair coin.

⁴Many different notions of objectivity are compatible with that assumption, as long as the right, correct or better answer is a fact that is determined entirely independently from the votes of the individuals. This excludes procedural notions of rightness, where the ‘right’ solution is right just because it was arrived at by applying the appropriate procedure.

⁵From R_i one can define i ’s vote as the random variable \mathbf{v}_i in $\{0, 1\}$ which matches the state \mathbf{x} in the event R_i and differs from \mathbf{x} otherwise. Conversely, if one were to start from \mathbf{v}_i one could define R_i as the event that $\mathbf{v}_i = \mathbf{x}$.

⁶The event M_n can be written as $\cup_{I \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}: \#I > n/2} \cap_{i \in I} R_i$, because M_n means that there is some set of individuals $I \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$ with more than $n/2$ members such that all individuals i in I

Classical Independence. Informally, the correct voting events are independent given the state. Formally, R_1, R_2, \dots are independent conditional on \mathbf{x} .

Classical Competence. Informally, the probability of correct voting given any state exceeds $\frac{1}{2}$ and is the same across voters. Formally, for each state $x \in \{0, 1\}$, $\Pr(R_i|x)$ exceeds $\frac{1}{2}$ and does not depend on i (but possibly on x).⁷

Condorcet Jury Theorem. Suppose Classical Independence and Classical Competence. As the group size increases, the probability $\Pr(M_n)$ that a majority votes correctly (i) increases⁸, and (ii) converges to one.

We now explain the two conditions and the theorem in turn. Events are (conditionally) independent if learning that some of them occurred does not change the (conditional) probability that others occurred.⁹ In our case, the probability that some voters vote correctly (conditional on a state) is not influenced by learning that some other voters vote correctly. An analogy with coin tossing might help. Suppose a coin is tossed independently many times, one toss for each voter. ‘Heads’ means voting for alternative 1, ‘tails’ means voting for 0. The coin is not just any coin but a *predictor coin* whose shape is influenced by the state of the world: it is biased towards the correct outcome, in analogy to Classical Competence. The tosses (votes) are not independent unconditionally, since from the outcome of some of the tosses we learn something about the coin shape, and hence about the other tosses. However, in analogy to Classical Independence the tosses are independent conditional on the state, since once we know the state, we know the shape of the coin, so that tosses do not tell us anything new about the coin shape and hence about other tosses.

With the two premises in place, we can turn to the theorem itself. The CJT is nothing but an application of the law of large numbers. In terms of our example, if the *predictor coin* is thrown very often, it becomes exceedingly likely that the majority of results will be correct, and this probability converges to 1 as the number of tosses tends to infinity. Large groups are essentially infallible, even if its members are only slightly competent (Goodin and Spiekermann 2011). For instance, with competence only $p = 0.51$, a group of 100,000 voters – which is still small for a modern democracy – would be correct in majority with a probability of about 0.9999999987. This prediction of infallibility for dichotomous factual choices does not withstand empirical scrutiny and will be revised in due course.

Importantly, this framework does not distinguish between someone’s vote and his sincere judgement. These two can come apart, since the sincere voting profile may not form a Nash equilibrium (in a suitably defined n -player Bayesian game with private information). This fact was long overlooked, presumably because it was taken for granted that strategic voting could not arise when all voters share the same preference

vote correctly, i.e., such that $\cap_{i \in I} R_i$ obtains.

⁷All probabilistic statements refer to a probability measure \Pr (defined over some underlying algebra of events).

⁸That is to say, *strictly* increases unless each voter is correct with probability one.

⁹Formally, events are independent if for any (finite) number of them the probability that they occur jointly equals the product of their probabilities. Conditional independence is defined analogously, with probabilities replaced by conditional probabilities.

for correct collective decisions; it was brought to light in seminal work by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000), and many others. As much as the literature’s current concern for strategic-voting-related shortcomings of the classical model is justified, it might have distracted the attention from the shortcomings of Condorcet’s explicit premises, notably Classical Independence. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, the strategic-voting literature on the CJT takes independence of private information for granted, while becoming more and more sophisticated on other dimensions. The current paper returns to the origins by analysing and revising Condorcet’s two explicit premises. Pursuing two goals at once is never a good idea, and therefore we do not address strategic voting here. But how is one to read our paper in light of the modern insights about strategic voting? *Either*, one simply assumes that people’s votes match their sincere judgements.¹⁰ *Or*, if one feels uncomfortable with this assumption, one may reinterpret R_i as the event that voter i ’s private pre-strategic judgement is correct (whether or not it matches i ’s vote), and M_n as the event that a majority holds the correct private judgement. Under the latter interpretation, this paper is not about voting but about private opinion formation and the majority opinion; and the insights gained here about private opinion formation would have to be combined with the modern insights about strategic voting in order to form a complete analysis of epistemic aggregation.

2 Common Causes and the Failure of the Classical Independence Assumption

In this section we show that Classical Independence typically does not hold in real-world decision problems and needs to be revised. Our critique of Classical Independence does not take the common line of pointing out that voters can influence each other; rather we show that Classical Independence is questionable even in the absence of any such causal influences between voters. We start by developing an example that we shall use repeatedly in due course. This will be followed by our core argument against Classical Independence: the observation that voters are typically influenced by common causes and therefore not independent in the classical sense. Our New Independence assumption responds to this problem.

Imagine a government relying on a group of economic advisers. Towards the end of 2007, when the US housing market starts dropping, the government wants to know whether a recession is imminent. It asks all advisers and adopts the majority view. To ensure that the experts do not influence each other, safeguards are in place to prevent any communication between them. If the classical CJT applied, we could conclude that the probability of a correct majority vote converges to 1 as more and more

¹⁰Under some specifications of the voters’ utilities, this typically implies that at least some voters vote irrationally. These specifications make a voter’s utility depend only on the pair of the state and the outcome (majority vote), where utility is high when the outcome matches the state and low otherwise. However, as is often overlooked, voting sincerely is typically rational as soon as voters also care at least slightly about whether their own vote is sincere (for when maximising expected utility the sincerity concern outweighs the outcome-oriented concern since the probability of pivotality is typically very small). Here, the sincere voting assumption of the classical CJT is compatible with game-theoretic rationality.

advisers are consulted. But this conclusion is unlikely to be true because Classical Independence is typically violated *even though* the experts do not communicate. To see this, consider a few examples. First, if all economists rely on the same publicly available evidence, then this evidence will usually cause them to vote in the same way. For instance, if all the evidence misleadingly suggests healthy growth (with the evidence indicating, say, that banks have much healthier balance sheets than they actually have) while a bank crash is already around the corner, then most reasonable economists will be wrong in their prediction. The votes are then dependent ‘through’ consulting the same evidence. More precisely, given for instance that alternative 1 is correct, incorrect votes for 0 by some voters raise the probability of misleading evidence, which in turn raises the probability that other voters also vote incorrectly, a violation of independence. Second, if all economists rely on the same theoretical assumptions for the interpretation of the evidence (such as low correlations between market prices of certain credit default swaps), this common influence is likely to induce dependence between the votes. In the extreme, either all get it right or all get it wrong. Finally, if the experts are more likely to make wrong predictions in weather that gives headaches, then weather creates dependence between votes. Again, in the extreme either all get it right or all get it wrong (and have headaches).

In all these examples, the economic experts are not classically independent and therefore the classical CJT cannot be applied. At the same time, the experts are independent in a different sense. They are independent if we hold all the common causes fixed, or, in different words, if we conditionalize on all the common causes that influence them. *Given* the economists’ particular common evidence, their common background theories, the commonly experienced weather, and all other common causes, their judgements *are* independent.

We now introduce our new conception of independence more systematically, drawing on the well-established theory of causal networks. The classical independence of votes can be undermined when a common cause influences all voters. This follows from Reichenbach’s influential *common cause principle*, which is usually understood thus: a more frequent than expected coincidence between a set of phenomena, which do not affect each other, is due to (possibly hidden) common causes, and the phenomena become independent once we conditionalize on these common causes (Reichenbach 1956, 159-60). Slightly more precisely:

Common Cause Principle (CCP). Any probabilistic dependence between phenomena which do not causally affect each other is due to common causes, and these phenomena become probabilistically independent once we conditionalize on their common causes.¹¹

One can represent common causes graphically, as in figure 1a. Figure 1a is a very simple causal network, depicting the causal relations between a set of variables. A node signifies a phenomenon, mathematically represented as a random variable. An

¹¹Usually, the common cause principle is stated for only two phenomena. We state it here for an arbitrary number of phenomena such as many votes. The CCP is developed more formally in the theory of Bayesian networks (e.g., Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993, and Pearl 2000).

arrow signifies a causal influence in the direction of the arrow.¹² For simplicity, this and all other figures show only the first two votes, labelled \mathbf{v}_1 and \mathbf{v}_2 . Both votes are causally influenced by a common cause \mathbf{c} (common causes are shown as grey nodes in all figures). If, for instance, the problem is to judge whether a defendant is guilty, then the common cause \mathbf{c} in figure 1a could be a commonly observed witness report, fingerprint, or other shared evidence; in all these examples, \mathbf{c} is causally influenced by the fact \mathbf{x} of whether the defendant is guilty, as represented by the arrow pointing from \mathbf{x} towards \mathbf{c} .¹³ The effect of \mathbf{c} on votes is indicated by the arrows from \mathbf{c} towards each vote. Note that there are no arrows between any votes, indicating that the votes do not have a causal influence on each other. But even though the votes are *causally* independent, they are not *probabilistically* independent due to the common cause \mathbf{c} .




Figure 1: Two simple causal networks with common causes.

Compare figure 1a with 1b. In 1b, the two votes \mathbf{v}_1 and \mathbf{v}_2 are still influenced by the common cause, but now the direction of causality between common cause and state is swapped so that \mathbf{c} is affecting \mathbf{x} . To make this plausible, consider an example. Suppose the task for the voters is to decide whether the streets are wet in Windsor, but all voters are placed in central London. Further suppose that the voters follow a simple heuristic: they predict that the streets are wet in Windsor if and only if the weather is bad in London. In that case, \mathbf{c} could be seen as the weather pattern over southeast England, influencing both the votes and the state. So, in this network the common cause \mathbf{c} (the weather) influences the state \mathbf{x} (dry or wet streets in Windsor), and not the other way round, unlike in figure 1a.

Let us consider a more complicated example. In figure 2 we include a number of causes from \mathbf{c}_1 to \mathbf{c}_3 . We can now distinguish between private and common causes. In this causal network, the cause \mathbf{c}_2 affects both votes and hence is a common cause. \mathbf{c}_1 and \mathbf{c}_3 , by contrast, are private causes because they only affect one vote each. By definition, common causes are nodes that have directed paths of arrows to more than one vote node. This is why \mathbf{x} is also a common cause (and is therefore displayed in

¹²We are not going to discuss causal and Bayesian networks in detail here. For a thorough introduction see Pearl 2000, ch. 1. Formally, a causal network is a so-called *directed acyclic graph*, which consists of a set of nodes (carrying random variables) and a set of directed arrows between distinct nodes (representing causal relevance between variables) such that there is no directed cycle of arrows.

¹³While votes are dichotomous random variables, taking only the values 0 or 1, a cause such as \mathbf{c} need not be dichotomous. For instance, shared evidence can take more than two forms.




Figure 2: A causal network with private and common causes.

grey): it has paths running to \mathbf{v}_1 (through \mathbf{c}_1 or \mathbf{c}_2) and to \mathbf{v}_2 (through \mathbf{c}_2 or \mathbf{c}_3).




Figure 3: A causal network with private and common causes, some of which are non-evidential.

Figure 3 shows another, slightly more complicated, causal network. As before, we have common causes (\mathbf{c}_3 , \mathbf{c}_4 and \mathbf{x}) and private causes (\mathbf{c}_1 , \mathbf{c}_2 , \mathbf{c}_5 and \mathbf{c}_6). But in contrast to the previous figures, we can now distinguish between non-evidential causes that are not related to the state (\mathbf{c}_2 , \mathbf{c}_4 and \mathbf{c}_6) and evidential causes that are. Non-evidential causes are factors that influence voters causally but do not provide them with evidence as to the correct alternative. These could be common non-evidential causes (such as the weather influencing all our economic advisors in the example above) or private non-evidential causes (such as a domestic argument influencing the judgment of one advisor).

In all figures shown so far the votes \mathbf{v}_1 and \mathbf{v}_2 are not state-conditionally independent because of common causes (other than \mathbf{x}). That votes have such common causes is not in any way unusual. To assume that there are none, as the classical CJT does, is to assume a highly construed, artificial decision problem that is unlikely to occur in real-life settings. Thus, Classical Independence is typically violated. This

means that the conclusions of the CJT rest on a (typically) false premise. The upshot is that the independence assumption must be revised.

We now introduce a more defensible independence assumption. The CCP implies that events are independent conditional on all their common causes. So independence of votes can be achieved if we conditionalize in the right way. The classical CJT conditionalized on \mathbf{x} only. But to catch all the common causes, both evidential and non-evidential, we propose to conditionalize on the *decision problem* at hand. The decision problem is a description of all relevant features of the task the group faces. The problem captures not only the state of the world but also all relevant circumstances, which we interpret as all common causes of the votes, thus excluding purely individual factors. We therefore conditionalize on the state of the world *and* all common causes, as indicated by the dashed rectangles in figures 1–3. Both components of a decision problem are indispensable. Defining the problem without the circumstances does not work, as we have seen. Defining it without the state \mathbf{x} is not plausible either, since this would leave the correct answer indeterminate. Often, \mathbf{x} is itself a common cause anyhow, as in figures 1a, 2 and 3 but not in figure 1b.

We now return to the formal model, leaving the motivational discussion based on causal networks behind. As far as model ingredients are concerned, only one amendment of the classical model is needed. We keep the correct voting events R_1, R_2, \dots but dispose of the state variable \mathbf{x} in favour of a new random variable π , the *problem*, whose realisations are the various possible problems π that the group might face.¹⁴ Interpretationally, the problem captures not just the state of the world but also the circumstances (common causes) the voters face.

We are now ready to state our revised independence premise.

New Independence. The events R_1, R_2, \dots that voters 1, 2, ... vote correctly are independent conditional on the problem π .¹⁵

This assumption is far more defensible than the classical one; by conditionalizing on the problem, we fix all those circumstances which, if left variable, could lead to voter correlation. In figure 3, for instance, by conditionalizing on the problem one conditionalizes on all the common causes, both evidential (like \mathbf{c}_3 in figure 3) and non-evidential (like \mathbf{c}_4 in figure 3), so that the two events become probabilistically independent. In the terminology of causal networks, the common causes ‘screen off’ the votes from each other, so that conditionalizing on these causes removes any correlations between votes.

For the interested reader, appendix B briefly sketches the more formal network-theoretic foundation of New Independence; there, the network-theoretic motivation given above is turned into a theorem.

¹⁴Problems can (and will in real life) be highly complex objects. Our model accounts for such complexity without loss of parsimony.

¹⁵Independence conditional on the random variable π means that for any value which π may take (with positive probability) there is independence conditional on π taking this value. This definition assumes that π is discrete, i.e., takes only countably many values. For the general definition of independence conditional on an arbitrary random variable we refer the reader to standard textbooks.

3 The Need to Revise the Competence Assumption

The Classical Competence assumption is not unreasonable; in fact it is plausibly true. It tells us that the voters are more likely to vote correctly than incorrectly. But when combined with our New Independence assumption (rather than with the unrealistic classical one) it doesn't imply that large groups are better than small ones in their majority judgements.

Consider our group of economic advisers again. It is plausible to assume that each economist is on average better than random in answering economic yes/no questions such as whether a recession is imminent. However, we also know that economists are often not competent when considering one single problem, because some problems are more difficult than others. For instance, very few economists correctly predicted that the initially quite limited banking crisis of 2008 would trigger a major recession in 2009. With hindsight we have learned that predicting this crisis was a *difficult* problem because economists faced misleading data and worked with questionable or incorrect assumptions. In many other settings, predicting a recession is *easy* (or at least easier) and economists are more likely to be correct in their predictions. Economists can be competent on average, as demanded by the Classical Competence assumption, without being competent on a difficult problem.

Classical Competence may hold, but since our New Independence assumption conditionalizes on the problem, we will need a problem-specific notion of competence. To show this need we give a stylized example in which large groups are *much* worse than small ones, despite classical voter competence. This demonstrates that the conclusions of the classical CJT may fail if Classical Independence is replaced with New Independence while retaining Classical Competence. Suppose there are only two types of problems, 'easy' and 'difficult' ones, where each type is equally likely to occur. Each voter i is correct on any easy problem with probability 0.99, and on any difficult one with probability 0.49. That is,

$$\Pr(R_i|\pi) = \begin{cases} 0.99 & \text{for every easy problem } \pi \\ 0.49 & \text{for every difficult problem } \pi. \end{cases}$$

First note that each voter i is competent in the sense that he votes correctly with probability $\Pr(R_i) = \frac{1}{2} \times 0.99 + \frac{1}{2} \times 0.49 = 0.74$. Also the two state-conditional competence parameters, $\Pr(R_i|\mathbf{x} = 1)$ and $\Pr(R_i|\mathbf{x} = 0)$, exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ under mild additional conditions (essentially, there shouldn't be a too high correlation between problem type and state). So, Classical Competence holds. Despite the voters' high competence, the majority's competence in a large group is low and well below individual competence. Indeed, the probability that the majority is correct is

$$\Pr(M_n) = \frac{1}{2} \times \Pr(M_n|\boldsymbol{\pi} \text{ is easy}) + \frac{1}{2} \times \Pr(M_n|\boldsymbol{\pi} \text{ is difficult}),$$

where the term $\Pr(M_n|\boldsymbol{\pi} \text{ is easy})$ is roughly one, but the term $\Pr(M_n|\boldsymbol{\pi} \text{ is difficult})$ is roughly $\frac{1}{2}$ if n is small (because voters are only slightly worse than fair coins) but

tends to zero as n tends to infinity;¹⁶ so,

$$\Pr(M_n) \approx \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} \times 1 + \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{3}{4} & \text{for small } n \\ \frac{1}{2} \times 1 + \frac{1}{2} \times 0 = \frac{1}{2} & \text{for large } n. \end{cases}$$

Large groups are worse here than small groups or single individuals! In terms of our example, asking just one economist would be better than asking many because the majority of the many is increasingly likely to get the difficult problem wrong.

We thus need a new notion of competence: one that is relative to the decision problem. Let us define a voter i 's (*problem-specific*) *competence* as $p_i^\pi = \Pr(R_i|\pi)$, the probability that i votes correctly conditional on the problem. Its value depends on the problem; intuitively, it is high for 'easy' problems and low for 'difficult' ones. In the last example, problem-specific competence is 0.99 or 0.49, depending on whether the problem is easy or difficult. The value taken for a particular problem π – a particular realisation of π – is called the *competence on π* , denoted $p_i^\pi = \Pr(R_i|\pi)$. Figure 4 gives an example of how the distribution of a voter i 's problem-specific




Figure 4: A discrete distribution of problem-specific competence with tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$. The x-axis shows competence levels, the y-axis their probabilities.

competence could look like. There is a 10% probability of facing a problem on which competence is as high as 1 (i.e., the voter is always right), a 20% probability of facing a problem on which competence is 0.8, and so on for the competence levels of 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 and 0. While in figure 4 problem-specific competence follows a discrete distribution (with six possible values), figure 5 shows an example in which problem-specific competence follows a continuous distribution given by a density function over the interval $[0, 1]$. Of course, many other discrete or continuous distributions of problem-specific competence are imaginable.

Notice that in figures 4 and 5 a voter's problem-specific competence on the interval $[0, 1]$ tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$, so that, informally, he is more likely to face an 'easy' problem

¹⁶It tends to zero because, given a difficult problem, the proportion of correct votes tends to 0.49 by the law of large numbers.




Figure 5: A continuous distribution of problem-specific competence with tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$. The x-axis shows competence levels, the y-axis their probability densities.

(on which competence is high) than a ‘difficult’ problem (on which competence is low). In short, the voter finds more problems easy than difficult. Clearly, this is a notion of voter ‘competence’, but a somewhat different one than that required by Classical Competence. To state this notion more precisely, we first formally define what it means for a (discrete or continuous) random variable or distribution in the interval $[0, 1]$ to *tend to exceed* $\frac{1}{2}$. In the discrete case (see figure 4), it simply means that the value $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ is at least as probable as the symmetrically opposed value $\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$, for all $\epsilon > 0$. In the continuous case with a continuous density function (see figure 5), it means that this density is at least as high at $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ as at $\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$, for all $\epsilon > 0$.¹⁷ (Since all inequalities need only hold weakly this is a weak definition of ‘tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ’; an alternative, strong definition is provided in appendix A.)

We are now ready to state the new competence assumption:

New Competence. Problem-specific competence p_i^π (i) tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ and (ii) is the same for all voters i , that is, $p_i^\pi \equiv p^\pi$.

To paraphrase this condition once more, the problem is more likely to be of the sort on which voters are competent than of the sort on which they are incompetent (where voters are homogeneous in competence, as in the classical setup). There are many plausible examples where (discrete or continuous) problem-specific competence tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$, as in figures 4 and 5.¹⁸

¹⁷There is a unified definition. An arbitrary random variable or distribution in $[0, 1]$ *tends to exceed* $\frac{1}{2}$ if a value in $[\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon, \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon']$ is at least as probable as a value in the symmetrically opposed interval $[\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon', \frac{1}{2} - \epsilon]$, for all $\epsilon' \geq \epsilon > 0$. This definition is equivalent to the first resp. second special definition stated in the main text if the distribution is of the first resp. second special kind.

¹⁸Regarding figure 4, check that $\Pr(p^\pi = 1) = 0.1 \geq 0.05 = \Pr(p^\pi = 0)$, $\Pr(p^\pi = 0.8) = 0.2 \geq 0.1 = \Pr(p^\pi = 0.2)$, $\Pr(p^\pi = 0.6) = 0.35 \geq 0.2 = \Pr(p^\pi = 0.4)$, and $\Pr(p^\pi = \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon) = 0 \geq 0 = \Pr(p^\pi = \frac{1}{2} - \epsilon)$ for all $\epsilon > 0$ such that $\epsilon \neq 0.1, 0.3, 0.5$. Regarding figure 5, check that the plotted density is at least as high at $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ as at $\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$ for all $\epsilon > 0$.

The New Competence assumption formalizes an idea stated informally at the beginning of the section in terms of our economist example. The economists face easy and difficult problems. Some problems are very hard, for example predicting the global recession of 2009, but fortunately not all problems are like that. If the economists are good economists they find most problems easy and fewer problems difficult. Unlike the Classical Competence assumption, our new assumption makes no explicit statement about the economists' *average* competence across all problems, or across all problems for which a given state x in $\{0, 1\}$ obtains. Instead, we assume that the economists more often have high than low competence.

As expected, our competence assumption fails for the paradoxical scenario discussed earlier in this section, since there a voter's problem-specific competence is *less* likely to be 0.51 than 0.49, since $\Pr(p^\pi = 0.51) = 0$ and $\Pr(p^\pi = 0.49) = \frac{1}{2}$.¹⁹ The violation of New Competence is the deeper reason for our counter-intuitive finding that large groups are worse than single individuals.

4 A New Jury Theorem

Our New Jury Theorem is based on the New Independence and Competence assumptions. To introduce it, consider again our panel of economic advisers having to predict whether there will be a recession. We assume (from New Independence) that given any problem the events of correct predictions are independent across voters. We also assume (from New Competence) that the prediction problem is more likely to be easy than difficult. Our New Jury Theorem states that increasing the group size will increase the probability of a correct majority, sampled across prediction problems. This is the old non-asymptotic conclusion of the CJT, but based on new premises. Our New Jury Theorem also states that for very large groups the collective competence no longer approaches one (revising the old, unrealistic asymptotic conclusion). Rather, the asymptotic value now depends on the proportion of easy problems.

More precisely, the theorem goes as follows:

New Jury Theorem. Suppose New Independence and New Competence. As the group size increases, the probability that a majority votes correctly (i) increases, and (ii) converges to a value which is less than one if $\Pr(p^\pi > \frac{1}{2}) \neq 1$ (and one if $\Pr(p^\pi > \frac{1}{2}) = 1$).

Remark: As the proof shows, the value to which the probability of a correct majority converges is

$$\Pr\left(p^\pi > \frac{1}{2}\right) + \frac{1}{2} \Pr\left(p^\pi = \frac{1}{2}\right),$$

¹⁹Note that the support of the competence distribution – namely, the set $\{.49, .99\}$ – seems artificial in that it is very small and not symmetric around the middle $\frac{1}{2}$. In modelling practice, most distributions on $[0, 1]$ are symmetric, as they are either continuous and supported by the full interval $[0, 1]$ (as in figure 5) or discrete and supported by a regular grid of the form $\{\frac{k}{m} : k = 0, \dots, m\}$ for a positive integer m (as in figure 4, where $m = 5$). As long as the competence distribution has symmetric support, this distribution is plausibly compatible with our New Competence assumption. By definition, the *support* of a distribution on $[0, 1]$ is the minimal topologically closed set $S \subseteq [0, 1]$ of probability one, and S is *symmetric* (around $\frac{1}{2}$) just in case $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \in S \Leftrightarrow \frac{1}{2} - \epsilon \in S$ for all $\epsilon > 0$.

the probability that the problem is easy plus half of the probability that the problem is on the boundary between easy and difficult.

While proving the non-asymptotic conclusion is not straightforward (see appendix C), it is easy to develop an intuition of what is driving the asymptotic conclusion and the remark. We know that voters (our economic advisers, for instance) have a probability greater than $\frac{1}{2}$ to vote correctly on easy problems, smaller than $\frac{1}{2}$ on difficult problems, and equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ on boundary problems. So, by the law of large numbers, in the limit the majority will be correct on easy problems, wrong on difficult problems, and correct with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ on boundary problems. Hence, the limiting probability of the majority being correct, averaged over all problems, is as specified in the remark. For example, if our economic advisers face easy problems 80%, difficult problems 20%, and boundary problems 0% of the time, then increasing the group of advisers will let their collective competence converge to 0.8.

The conclusion that majority performance increases crucially depends on the assumption that problem-specific competence tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$. We have so far only defined a *weak* sense of ‘tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ’, while relegating an alternative, strong definition to appendix A. If in our theorem we use the weak definition, then in the conclusion ‘increases’ means ‘weakly increases’ because of some rare, degenerate cases in which majority performance remains constant.²⁰ But if we use the strong definition, then ‘increases’ means ‘strictly increases’. See appendix A for details.

The mathematical power and generality of our New Jury Theorem is that it holds regardless of how we specify the problem variable π . Indeed, although we have suggested a specific interpretation of π – it captures common causes – we are *mathematically* free in how we specify it. Let us illustrate this flexibility by considering two very simple specifications, which depart from our suggested interpretation by not capturing the common causes. These ‘naive’ specifications allow us to recover (in fact, strengthen) the classical CJT in two variants. For under these specifications our premises and conclusions reduce to the classical ones.

First, suppose π takes only two values, 0 and 1, representing the state of the world. So π plays precisely the same role as the state in the classical CJT; we accordingly write \mathbf{x} for π . To show that we obtain the Classical CJT, note that Classical Independence implies (in fact, is directly equivalent to) New Independence, and Classical Competence implies New Competence, so that our theorem tells us that the probability of a correct majority vote is increasing in group size and (by $\Pr(p^{\mathbf{x}} > \frac{1}{2}) = 1$) converges to one, just as in the Classical CJT. In fact, this strengthens the Classical CJT since New Competence is a weaker premise than Classical Competence.²¹

Second, assume even more simply that π takes only *one* value – there is just a single problem. Conditionalizing on this fixed problem is as much as not conditionalizing at all. Therefore, our two premises take a particularly simple form:

- the events R_1, R_2, \dots are (unconditionally) independent, and

²⁰Such as the case that p^{π} is distributed *exactly symmetrically* around $\frac{1}{2}$ (here this probability is constantly $\frac{1}{2}$), or the case that problem-specific competence p^{π} is *always one* (here the probability of a correct majority is constantly one).

²¹Because under New Competence a voter’s problem-specific (‘state-specific’) competence $p^{\mathbf{x}}$ need not *always* exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ as long as it tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ in our technical sense. For instance, it could be that $p^1 = 0.6$ and $p^0 = 0.4$, where \mathbf{x} is more likely 1 than 0.

- competence – the unconditional probability $\Pr(R_i)$ – is at least $\frac{1}{2}$ and the same across voters.

As for our theorem’s conclusions, they are here the classical ones: majority competence is increasing in group size and converges to one (unless competence is *exactly* $\frac{1}{2}$).

5 Epistemic Democracy: Deliberation and Education

Our findings have implications for theories of epistemic democracy. This section develops two issues. First, our framework brings to light the benefits of deliberation by removing the worry that independence could be undermined once our new independence notion is adopted. Second, the framework rehabilitates the importance of individual competence for group performance, and hence of education and other competence-boosting policy measures.

Normatively attractive conceptions of democracy involve interactions of voters before the vote. Indeed, many democratic theorists emphasize the importance of deliberation for democratic legitimacy or the quality of democratic outputs. The problem is that such interactions may undermine independence when construed classically, as many have stressed. Nonetheless, confusion prevails over *how* deliberation creates dependence, and what this implies for jury theorems. Adrian Vermeule describes the challenge well:

“What is unclear is whether, and to what extent, independence is compromised by deliberation, discussion, or even common social background or professional training. [...] Absent any general account of this, the basic reach of the Jury Theorem is not well understood and no amount of possibility theorems or anecdotes about wise crowds will tell us whether the Theorem is an important tool of political and legal theory or a minor curiosity.” (Vermeule 2009, 6–7, reference and footnote omitted)

Our analysis responds to this challenge by offering the required ‘general account’ – in terms of causal networks – and by revising the independence notion so as to conditionalize on all common causes, including deliberation. A somewhat different response would be to stick to Classical Independence and try to enforce it by preventing all deliberation, as discussed by Grofman and Feld (1988) in their seminal work connecting the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Rousseau’s ‘general will’. Many find this approach normatively unacceptable. Aside from the normative worry, preventing deliberation is only sensible if it is true that deliberation creates dependence. But is it? Jeremy Waldron is guardedly optimistic that it is not:

“The sort of interaction between voters that would compromise independence would be interaction in which voter X decided in favour of a given option just because voter Y did. [...] But X’s being persuaded by Y in argument or holding itself open to such persuasion does not in itself involve X’s deciding to vote one way rather than another because of the way Y is voting.” (Waldron in Estlund et al. 1989, 1327)

Waldron here identifies the paradigmatic case of dependence: one voter following another blindly. Spelled out in our causal-network-theoretic terms, Waldron’s point is that persuasion and deliberation by themselves do not undermine independence because they do not constitute causal effects (arrows) *between* votes but causal effects (arrows) from earlier phenomena \mathbf{c} – such as speech acts – to votes. Thus restated, it becomes clear that Waldron’s argument is in fact a defense of New rather than Classical Independence, since persuasive speech acts will, like other common causes of votes, threaten Classical but not New Independence. Indeed, persuasion counts among the more subtle threats to Classical Independence, working through common causation rather than inter-causation of votes, as illustrated in many of our figures above. Persuasion and deliberation could, for instance, mean that the voters align their theories or the set of evidence they use, thereby introducing powerful common causes that undermine Classical Independence.

David Estlund points out that Classical Independence can sometimes be met even when there are common causes or inter-causation of votes (Estlund 2008, 225). He refers to causal setups where the different effects cancel each other out such that probabilistic independence obtains. It needs to be said, however, that while such settings are logically possible, they are exceedingly rare, especially when many voters are involved. Typically, common causes are ubiquitous, and there is little hope that Classical Independence is preserved after deliberation.

However, deliberation does not *necessarily* increase voter dependence in the classical sense. It could decrease dependence by reducing the influence of certain other common causes (like room temperature) or direct causal influences between voters. It is therefore not always obvious whether deliberation overall increases or decreases dependence, another reason why the classical CJT literature struggles so much with deliberation. Our framework, by contrast, avoids this fruitless struggle. We give the deliberative process its proper place by including it in the description of the problem π , and after having conditionalized on this richly described problem, deliberation does not threaten independence any more.

The classical framework leaves one with the unsatisfactory diagnosis that successful deliberation typically increases voter competence on the one hand, but typically reduces voter independence on the other. Given this unresolved trade-off, the overall effect on group performance could be positive or negative. The diverging claims in the literature about whether deliberation is beneficial demonstrate this all too well. With our New Theorem, by contrast, we can focus exclusively on how deliberation affects (New) Competence. In the language of our framework, deliberation is epistemically beneficial if it increases the voters’ problem-specific competence (that is, shifts its distribution to the right). If it does, it also raises the probability that a majority is correct. Thus, deliberation should be interpreted as a process that affects the probability distribution of problem-specific competence, without undermining New Independence. For illustration, consider our economic advisers one last time. If they deliberate and exchange evidence or views, they do not thereby threaten New Independence (because this deliberation process is part of the problem we conditionalize on), but they might raise their problem-specific competence, turning difficult into easier problems. Consequently, a group of deliberating economists may perform better because they are more likely to face decisions they tend to get right, while isolated

economists may not.

Our framework has another advantage over the classical one. In its policy recommendation, the classical framework puts all the emphasis on increasing the size of the electorate, suggesting that this suffices for optimal group performance. Classically, large groups can be made infallible without increasing individual competence, just by increasing group size. This loses sight of another important aspect of institutional design: the improvement of individual competence. Our framework restores the picture, showing that individual competence levels matter considerably, since they determine the upper bound on group performance. Policy measures such as improving education may raise the upper bound. Put bluntly, not just the size but also the quality of crowds matters.

6 A New Jury Theorem for Interchangeable Voters

Ladha (1993) proves a jury theorem based on the assumption that the voters (more precisely, the events that they vote correctly) are *interchangeable* in de Finetti's sense. Our New Jury Theorem is mathematically related to Ladha's jury theorem for interchangeable voters. In fact, it implies a more general variant of Ladha's theorem, as we now show.

Intuitively, finitely many events are interchangeable if they are perfectly symmetric in their probabilities. For instance, the probability that only the first event holds equals the probability that only the fourth holds, the probability that only the first and third hold equals the probability that only the second and fifth hold, and so on. Formally, the sequence of correct voting events in the group of size n , (R_1, \dots, R_n) , is *interchangeable* if for any permutation $(R_{i_1}, \dots, R_{i_n})$ and any subgroup $J \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$, it is equally likely that only the voters in J vote correctly as it is that only the voters in $\{i_j : j \in J\}$ vote correctly, i.e.,

$$\Pr \left(\left(\bigcap_{i \in J} R_i \right) \cap \left(\bigcap_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\} \setminus J} \overline{R_i} \right) \right) = \Pr \left(\left(\bigcap_{i \in J} R_{i_j} \right) \cap \left(\bigcap_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\} \setminus J} \overline{R_{i_j}} \right) \right),$$

where \overline{A} stands for the complement of the event A .²² If for every group size n the events (R_1, \dots, R_n) are interchangeable, then the infinitely many events (R_1, R_2, \dots) are called *interchangeable*.

Ladha makes the following assumption:

Voter Interchangeability. The events of correct voting (R_1, R_2, \dots) are interchangeable.

The assumption of interchangeability can be motivated by interpreting probabilities as representing the beliefs of an observer or social planner with limited information, who takes the voters to be perfectly symmetric (no matter whether voters are *objectively* similar in that way). The mathematical import of voter interchangeability is

²²Put differently, the events (R_1, \dots, R_n) are exchangeable if their joint distribution (or more precisely, the joint distribution in $\{0, 1\}^n$ of the indicator random variables of these events) is invariant under permutation.

that, by de Finetti's Theorem (1937), it implies the existence of a (discrete or continuous) random variable α in $[0, 1]$, conditional on which these correct voting events (i) are independent and (ii) each have the same probability $\Pr(R_i|\alpha) = \alpha$.

This conditional independence of the correct voting events suggests applying our New Jury Theorem to the case in which the problem π is defined as α (which is mathematically possible, although it deviates from our interpretation of π as capturing common causes). For this specification of the problem π the homogeneity part of New Competence holds since problem-specific competence $\Pr(R_i|\pi) (= \Pr(R_i|\alpha) = \alpha)$ is the same for all voters i . In addition, we obtain the peculiar result that problem-specific competence $\Pr(R_i|\pi)$ and the problem π are *the same random variable* (namely, α), so that problem-specific competence tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ (as assumed in New Competence) just in case $\pi (= \alpha)$ tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$. Hence, our New Jury Theorem can be re-stated as follows for this particular specification of the problem:

Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters. Suppose Voter Interchangeability holds and the random variable α obtained in de Finetti's Theorem tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$. As the group size increases, the probability that a majority votes correctly (i) increases, and (ii) converges to a value which is less than one if $\Pr(\alpha > \frac{1}{2}) \neq 1$ (and one if $\Pr(\alpha > \frac{1}{2}) = 1$).

Conceptually, this theorem operates in a slimmer setup than our earlier theorem because it does not require the exogenous random variable π . Instead, it draws on the random variable α , which is generated endogenously from the assumption of interchangeability. One may interpret α as the degree to which the decision task at hand is 'easy', since conditional on α a voter votes correctly with probability α .

The variable α is less obscure than it may seem, since it can be defined directly from the correctness events R_1, R_2, \dots . Indeed, α can be obtained as the *correctness frequency*, i.e., the proportion of correct votes (in the limit as the group size increases). Using this approach to α , one may reformulate our Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters without referring to de Finetti's Theorem. Details are given in appendix A.

Again, the theorem can be read in different ways, depending on whether 'tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ' is defined in a weak or strong sense. In the first case the term 'increases' in the theorem's conclusion means 'weakly increases' (since in rare and degenerate cases majority performance remains constant), while in the second case 'increases' means 'strictly increases'.

How does our theorem generalize Ladha's precursor? Ladha assumes Voter Interchangeability (like us) and assumes that the distribution of α is of a certain kind, which is a special case of our assumption that α tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$.²³ From these assumptions, Ladha deduces that the probability of majority correctness weakly exceeds the probability of single-voter correctness $\Pr(R_i)$, which follows from our non-asymptotic conclusion.²⁴

²³Specifically, he assumes that the distribution of α either (i) is unimodal and symmetric with mean greater than $1/2$, or (ii) has support included in $(1/2, 1]$, or (iii) is a beta-distribution with mean greater than $1/2$. In each case, the distribution tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$.

²⁴More precisely, he states that the probability of majority correctness *strictly* exceeds the probability of single-voter correctness. This strict inequality does not follow from Ladha's assumptions

Finally, we remark that the value to which the probability of a correct majority converges in the theorem is

$$\Pr\left(\mathbf{a} > \frac{1}{2}\right) + \frac{1}{2} \Pr\left(\mathbf{a} = \frac{1}{2}\right).$$

7 Conclusion

Condorcet’s classical jury theorem has an enormous influence, but its independence assumption is implausible and is responsible for the overly optimistic asymptotic conclusion that ‘large groups are infallible’. The non-asymptotic conclusion that ‘larger groups perform better’, by contrast, is often plausible, but is in need of a new justification, grounded on more defensible premises. We have provided such a justification. Our revised independence assumption does not require independence across all decision problems but independence *given the specific problem*. This allows us to conditionalize on common causes which would otherwise have induced dependence. This new independence assumption requires a new competence assumption: rather than assuming voter competence on average over all problems, we assume that the voters’ problem-specific competence is more often high than low. Based on our two revised premises, our New Jury Theorem retains the classical conclusion that ‘larger crowds are wiser’ but obtains the new asymptotic conclusion that ‘large crowds are fallible’. Specifically, the probability of a correct majority vote converges to the probability that the problem is easy in a technical sense. These conclusions vindicate majoritarian democracy – it is worth listening to many rather than few – without being absurdly optimistic about the correctness of democratic decisions. The move from the classical CJT to our New Jury Theorem can be summarized in a table:

	Classical CJT	New Jury Theorem
Independence premise	implausible	plausible
Competence premise	plausible	plausible
Do larger groups perform better?	yes	yes
Are very large groups infallible?	yes	no

Our theorem leads to different policy implications than the classical one with regard to the importance of deliberation and education. The worry that deliberation threatens voter independence disappears by moving to our new notion of independence, so that one can focus on the potentially beneficial effect of deliberation on voter competence. The importance of promoting voter competence (through education, deliberation and other measures) is rehabilitated. Indeed, while the classical model implies that the level of voter competence is essentially irrelevant – since large enough groups are infallible even if their members are just a little competent – our model implies that the performance of large groups strongly depends on voter competence, as measured by the proportion of decision problems voters find easy (in our technical sense). Overall, we believe our findings give more credibility to epistemic arguments for democracy based on jury theorems.

in the form (i) or (ii) mentioned in fn. 23 (as is seen from the case that $\Pr(\boldsymbol{\alpha} = 1) = 1$). Ladha’s result (i.e., his Proposition 1) may be repaired either by weakening the result’s conclusion to a weak inequality or by adding to the result’s premises the assumption that $\Pr(\boldsymbol{\alpha} = 1) \neq 1$.

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A Some Extensions

First extension. As already mentioned, there are different readings or variants of our New Jury Theorem. They differ, firstly, in the precise definition of when a random variable (here, problem-specific competence) 'tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ', and secondly,

in whether the theorem's conclusion that majority performance increases holds in the weak or strict sense. Only one (weak) notion of 'tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ' was defined in the main text; it leads to weakly increasing group performance (though the cases where majority performance increases *non-strictly* are rare and degenerate; see footnote 20 for examples).

We now introduce two alternative notions of when a random variable or distribution in $[0, 1]$ 'tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ '. (We state the definitions for the discrete case; see footnote 25 for the general case.) Our original ('first') notion can be termed '*weak* tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ' and was defined by the condition that

$$\text{for all } \epsilon \in (0, \frac{1}{2}] \text{ the value } \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \text{ is at least as probable as } \frac{1}{2} - \epsilon. \quad (1)$$

To obtain the second notion we modify this condition by lifting the requirement about the probabilities of the boundary values 1 and 0. The second notion can be termed '*weak* tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ *within the open interval* $(0, 1)$ ' and is defined by the following condition (note that $\epsilon \neq \frac{1}{2}$):

$$\text{for all } \epsilon \in (0, \frac{1}{2}) \text{ the value } \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \text{ is at least as probable as } \frac{1}{2} - \epsilon. \quad (2)$$

Finally, to obtain the third notion we further modify the condition by excluding the extreme case that all inequalities are equalities. This third notion can be termed '*strong* tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ *within* $(0, 1)$ ' and is defined by the condition that²⁵

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{for all } \epsilon \in (0, \frac{1}{2}), \text{ the value } \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \text{ is at least as probable as } \frac{1}{2} - \epsilon, \\ &\text{and at least one of these inequalities holds in the strict sense.} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

We can now formally state three alternative readings of our New Jury Theorem:

Remark. The New Jury Theorem holds in three variants: we may

- (a) use the first notion of 'tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ' and define 'increasingness' weakly; or
- (b) use the second notion of 'tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ' and define 'increasingness' weakly; or
- (c) use the third notion of 'tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ' and define 'increasingness' strictly.

Variant (a) of the theorem uses the main text's definition of 'tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ '. Variant (b) logically strengthens variant (a) by lifting the assumption that problem-specific competence is at least as likely to be 1 than 0. Variant (c) shows that our strong sense of 'tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ' allows for the stronger conclusion that group performance grows *strictly*.

Note that the probabilities with which problem-specific competence takes on any of the boundary values 0 and 1 is irrelevant for the growth of majority performance,

²⁵In the general, possibly non-discrete case, the three notions are defined as follows. The generalization of (1) is that, for all $0 < \epsilon \leq \epsilon' \leq \frac{1}{2}$, a value in $[\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon, \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon']$ is at least as probable as a value in the symmetrically opposed interval $[\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon', \frac{1}{2} - \epsilon]$. The generalization of (2) is obtained by replacing ' $\epsilon' \leq \frac{1}{2}$ ' by ' $\epsilon' < \frac{1}{2}$ '. The generalization of (3) is obtained by moreover adding the requirement that at least one of the inequalities holds strictly (or equivalently, by adding the requirement that the probability of the interval $(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ strictly exceeds that of the interval $(0, \frac{1}{2})$).

and for whether this growth is strict. In short, the boundary values do not matter because conditional on problem-specific competence being 1 (resp. 0) the probability of a correct majority is constant – it equals 1 (resp. 0) regardless of the group size.

Second extension. Our Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters also has different readings:

Remark. Our Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters holds in each of the variants (a), (b) and (c) of the previous remark.

Note again that whether majority performance grows – and whether it does so strictly – only depends on how the variable α is distributed *within* $(0, 1)$.

Third extension. The variable α in our Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters can be defined as the *correctness frequency*. The correctness frequency is formally defined as the limit as $n \rightarrow \infty$ of the proportion of correct votes $\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \chi_{R_i}$, where χ_{R_i} is the indicator variable of R_i , which is 1 if R_i holds and 0 otherwise. To see why the correctness frequency equals α (except on a zero-probability event), observe that, for every value α of α , it is true that conditional on $\alpha = \alpha$ the correct voting events are independent with equal probabilities $\Pr(R_i|\alpha) = \alpha$, so that by the law of large numbers the correctness frequency $\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \chi_{R_i}$ converges to α with probability one.²⁶

This observation about α implies that our Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters can be re-stated without invoking de Finetti’s Theorem, namely by replacing ‘the random variable α obtained in de Finetti’s Theorem’ by ‘the correctness frequency α ’. The theorem then states as follows (where the only modified part is put in italics):²⁷

Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters. Suppose Voter Interchangeability holds and *the correctness frequency α* tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$. As the group size increases, the probability that a majority votes correctly (i) increases, and (ii) converges to a value which is less than one if $\Pr(\alpha > \frac{1}{2}) \neq 1$ (and one if $\Pr(\alpha > \frac{1}{2}) = 1$).

B The Causal Foundations of New Independence

We here introduce causal network terminology more precisely, and give sufficient conditions on causal interconnections for New Independence, citing a result to be proved in a more technical follow-up paper. Mathematically, this appendix is independent of

²⁶The more formal argument goes as follows. The correctness frequency – call it β – is defined as $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \chi_{R_i}$, where in the event that $\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \chi_{R_i}$ does not converge β is defined arbitrarily (this event has zero probability under Voter Interchangeability, as will turn out in a moment). Now assume Voter Interchangeability and consider the random variable α obtained in de Finetti’s Theorem. Then β equals α (outside a zero-probability event) for the following reason. It suffices to show that $E(|\beta - \alpha|) = 0$. We have $\Pr(\beta = \alpha|\alpha) = 1$ by the law-of-large-numbers argument given in the main text. So, $E(|\beta - \alpha||\alpha) = 0$. Hence, $E(|\beta - \alpha|) = E(E(|\beta - \alpha||\alpha)) = E(0) = 0$, as required. The shown fact that $\Pr(\beta = \alpha) = 1$ also implies that the case in which β was defined arbitrarily – i.e., in which $\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \chi_{R_i}$ does not converge – is a zero-probability event.

²⁷Also this re-stated theorem holds in the three variants.

the main text; it uses a different, explicitly network-theoretic model in order to give *foundations* for New Independence. In this appendix, causal relations are part of the formal setup, and the problem π is not a primitive but is *defined* as the complex random variable consisting of all common causes of votes plus the state \mathbf{x} (if not already a common cause). In this setup, we give a formal justification of New Independence in the form of a theorem which derives, rather than assumes, New Independence, based on plausible conditions on the causal relations, which are met in figures 1–3 and in many other causal networks.

In a causal network, a variable \mathbf{a} is said to be a *direct cause* of another \mathbf{b} (and \mathbf{b} a *direct effect* of \mathbf{a}) if there is an arrow pointing from \mathbf{a} to \mathbf{b} ($\mathbf{a} \rightarrow \mathbf{b}$). Further, \mathbf{a} is a *cause* of \mathbf{b} (and \mathbf{b} an *effect* of \mathbf{a}) if there is a directed path from \mathbf{a} to \mathbf{b} , i.e., a sequence of variables starting with \mathbf{a} and ending with \mathbf{b} such that each of these variables (except from the last one) directly causes the next one. A variable is a *common cause* (*effect*) of some variables if it is a cause (effect) of each of them. A variable is a *private cause* of a vote if it is a cause of this vote but of no other votes.

The following can be proved:

Theorem (informally stated). Suppose the votes $\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_2, \dots$ and the state \mathbf{x} are part of a causal network over these and any number of other random variables, and suppose probabilities are compatible with these causal relations.²⁸

- (a) If no vote is a cause of any other vote, then the votes are independent conditional on the set \mathcal{C} of all common causes of some votes;
- (b) If no vote is a cause of any other vote, *and* the state \mathbf{x} is not a common effect of any votes or private causes thereof²⁹, then the votes are also independent conditional on the augmented set $\mathcal{C} \cup \{\mathbf{x}\}$ (i.e., New Independence holds with the problem identified with this augmented set).




Figure 6: Violations of New Independence.

Many different causal networks, such as those in figures 1–3, meet the conditions laid out in part (b) of the theorem. In such networks the votes are independent conditional on the problem and New Independence holds. However, some rather special causal setups violate the conditions of part (b), hence of New Independence.

²⁸Compatibility means that any variable is independent of its non-effects conditional on its direct causes. This requirement is called the Parental Markov Condition.

²⁹In other words, the state \mathbf{x} is not a common effect of variables each of which is or privately causes a different vote.

We give three elementary examples in figure 6. Note that votes have no common causes in 6b and 6c, and have just \mathbf{x} as a common cause in 6a, so that in all three cases the problem on which we conditionalize consists of \mathbf{x} alone. Therefore, New and Classical Independence here reduce to the same condition, so that the figures are in fact counterexamples to *both* independence conditions. In 6a, vote 1 influences vote 2. With such a direct causal connection between the votes independence is clearly violated. In 6b, the votes cause the state of the world, which is implausible. Such a network could arise if the state of the world (the correct judgment) was simply *defined* as the majority judgment, but this is incompatible with a procedure-independent notion of correctness as usually assumed in epistemic conceptions of democracy. Again, independence is violated.³⁰

A more complicated case is displayed in figure 6c. Here the state is the causal product of two different private causes of votes. Independence would require that the votes are independent conditional on the state. But this is not the case, as we can see by considering the following interpretation of causal network 6c. Suppose state \mathbf{x} represents the fact of whether parties A and B will form a coalition. Suppose, for simplicity, that A and B will form a coalition if and only if in each party a majority of members supports forming the coalition. \mathbf{c}_1 represents the fact of whether there is enough support in A, \mathbf{c}_2 of whether there is enough support in B. Voter 1 is an expert for party A, and bases his prediction entirely on the mood in party A (thus \mathbf{c}_1 's causal effect on \mathbf{v}_1), while voter 2 is an expert for party B and bases her prediction only on the mood in B (thus \mathbf{c}_2 's causal effect on \mathbf{v}_2). Thus, each voter votes that the coalition takes place just in case he or she thinks there is enough support in the party studied. Imagine we know that the state is, say, that the coalition does not take place. If Independence were true, then voter 1's vote could not tell us anything about voter 2's vote. But voter 1's vote *can* tell us something: if voter 1 votes, say, for the coalition taking place, then voter 2 probably votes the opposite, because voter 1's vote indicates that party A is willing, and hence (since the coalition does not take place) that party B refuses to coalesce, which voter 2 will know.

The upshot of this discussion is that our New Independence assumption will hold for most causal setups, but is violated when either there is a direct causal relation between the votes, or the state is itself commonly caused by votes or private causes thereof. This is not only a problem for New Independence – Classical Independence is also violated under such circumstances.

C Proof of our New Jury Theorem

We now prove our New Jury Theorem (in all three variants mentioned in appendix A). Two preliminary remarks are due. First, for simplicity we assume that the set

³⁰If Independence were true, then given that the state is 1 the event of voter 1 voting for 1 would be independent of the event that all other voters vote for 1. But these two events are negatively correlated: $\Pr(\mathbf{v}_1 = 1 | \mathbf{v}_2 = \dots = \mathbf{v}_n = 1, \mathbf{x} = 1) < \Pr(\mathbf{v}_1 = 1 | \mathbf{x} = 1)$. The reason for this inequality is that the left hand side reduces to $\Pr(\mathbf{v}_1 = 1 | \mathbf{v}_2 = \dots = \mathbf{v}_n = 1)$ (since the event that $\mathbf{v}_2 = \dots = \mathbf{v}_n = 1$ implies that $\mathbf{x} = 1$), which equals $\Pr(\mathbf{v}_1 = 1)$ (since the votes are independent unconditionally), which in turn is smaller than $\Pr(\mathbf{v}_1 = 1 | \mathbf{x} = 1)$ (since the events that $\mathbf{v}_1 = 1$ and that $\mathbf{x} = 1$ are positively correlated because 1's voting for 1 partially explains that $\mathbf{x} = 1$).

of possible problems, to be denoted Π , is countable (with each of its subsets being measurable), and that every problem $\pi \in \Pi$ occurs with positive probability: $\Pr(\pi) > 0$. As a result, problem-specific competence has a discrete distribution over $[0, 1]$, supported by a finite set (as in figure 4) or a countably infinite set. Proofs without this restriction are available on request; they express expectations using (Lebesgue) integrals instead of sums.

Second, some of the summations used below involve an apparently uncountable number of terms (as in ‘ $\sum_{p \in [0,1]} \dots$ ’). Nonetheless these sums are well-defined because the number of *non-zero* terms is always countable (and because if this number is countably infinite then the sum converges to a value that does not depend on the order of summation).

We now turn to the proof. Suppose New Independence and New Competence hold. The proof proceeds in four steps. Only the last step uses that problem-specific competence tends to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ (and hence, only that step distinguishes between the three versions of the theorem, i.e., the three possible definitions of ‘tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ’ given in appendix A).

Step 1. Fix any group size n in $\{1, 3, 5, \dots\}$. For any problem $\pi \in \Pi$ consider $\Pr(M_n|\pi)$, the conditional probability that the number of correct votes exceeds $\frac{n}{2}$ given the problem π . Given the problem π , this number is the sum of n independent Bernoulli variables with parameter p^π (by New Independence and New Competence). Hence this number follows a Binomial distribution with parameters n and p^π , that is, takes each value m in $\{0, 1, \dots, n\}$ with probability $\frac{n!}{m!(n-m)!} (p^\pi)^m (1 - p^\pi)^{n-m}$, and more generally falls into each set of values $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ with a probability of

$$B_{n,p^\pi}(S) := \sum_{m \in \{0,1,\dots,n\} \cap S} \frac{n!}{m!(n-m)!} (p^\pi)^m (1 - p^\pi)^{n-m}.$$

To obtain the probability of a correct majority given π , we have to take $S = (\frac{n}{2}, n]$:

$$\Pr(M_n|\pi) = B_{n,p^\pi} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right).$$

By averaging over all possible problems, we obtain the *unconditional* probability that a majority is correct:

$$\Pr(M_n) = \sum_{\pi \in \Pi} \Pr(M_n|\pi) \Pr(\pi) = \sum_{\pi \in \Pi} B_{n,p^\pi} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \Pr(\pi).$$

By partitioning the set of all problems Π into subsets of problems with equal voter competence $p \in [0, 1]$, the summation ‘ $\sum_{\pi \in \Pi}$ ’ becomes equivalent to a nested summation ‘ $\sum_{p \in [0,1]} \sum_{\pi \in \Pi: p^\pi = p}$ ’. Thereby we obtain that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(M_n) &= \sum_{p \in [0,1]} B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \sum_{\pi \in \Pi: p^\pi = p} \Pr(\pi) \\ &= \sum_{p \in [0,1]} B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \Pr(p^\pi = p). \end{aligned}$$

We split the last expression into a sum $S_1 + S_2 + S_3$, where S_1 , S_2 and S_3 are defined by restricting the summation index p to values above, below, or equal to $\frac{1}{2}$, respectively. Specifically, S_1 is given by

$$S_1 = \sum_{p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]} B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \Pr(p^\pi = p). \quad (4)$$

Next, S_2 is given by

$$\begin{aligned} S_2 &= \sum_{p \in [0, \frac{1}{2})} B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \Pr(p^\pi = p) \\ &= \sum_{p \in [0, \frac{1}{2})} \left\{ 1 - B_{n,p} \left(\left[0, \frac{n}{2} \right) \right) \right\} \Pr(p^\pi = p) \\ &= \sum_{p \in [0, \frac{1}{2})} \Pr(p^\pi = p) - \sum_{p \in [0, \frac{1}{2})} B_{n,p} \left(\left[0, \frac{n}{2} \right) \right) \Pr(p^\pi = p). \end{aligned}$$

This expression is the difference of (i) a sum which reduces to $\Pr(p^\pi < \frac{1}{2})$, and (ii) another sum which (through a change of variable from p to $1 - p$) can be rewritten as

$\sum_{p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]} B_{n,1-p} \left(\left[0, \frac{n}{2} \right) \right) \Pr(p^\pi = 1 - p)$. Here, $B_{n,1-p} \left(\left[0, \frac{n}{2} \right) \right)$ can in turn be rewritten as $B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right)$; the reason is that

$$\begin{aligned} B_{n,1-p} \left(\left[0, \frac{n}{2} \right) \right) &= \sum_{m=0, \dots, \frac{n-1}{2}} \frac{n!}{m!(n-m)!} (1-p)^m p^{n-m} \text{ and} \\ B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) &= \sum_{m=\frac{n+1}{2}, \dots, n} \frac{n!}{m!(n-m)!} p^m (1-p)^{n-m}, \end{aligned}$$

where the sums appearing on the right hand sides coincide, as is seen from a change of variable from m to $n - m$. We have thus shown that

$$S_2 = \Pr \left(p^\pi < \frac{1}{2} \right) - \sum_{p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]} B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \Pr(p^\pi = 1 - p). \quad (5)$$

Finally, S_3 is given by

$$S_3 = B_{n, \frac{1}{2}} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \Pr(p^\pi = \frac{1}{2}).$$

Here, $B_{n, \frac{1}{2}} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right)$ is, just as $B \left(\left[0, \frac{n}{2} \right) \right)$, equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ because the binomial distribution $B_{n, \frac{1}{2}}$ is symmetric around its mean $\frac{n}{2}$. So,

$$S_3 = \frac{1}{2} \Pr \left(p^\pi = \frac{1}{2} \right). \quad (6)$$

By adding expressions 4, 5 and 6, we obtain that

$$\Pr(M_n) = S_1 + S_2 + S_3 = \sum_{p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]} B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \Delta(p) + \Gamma, \quad (7)$$

where $\Delta(p)$ and Γ are defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(p) &= \Pr(p^\pi = p) - \Pr(p^\pi = 1 - p), \\ \Gamma &= \Pr \left(p^\pi < \frac{1}{2} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \Pr \left(p^\pi = \frac{1}{2} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Step 2. In this step we show that for fixed $p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]$ the binomial probability in 7,

$$P_n := B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right), \quad (8)$$

is weakly increasing in (odd) n , and strictly so if $p \neq 1$. This fact (which is of course closely related to the non-asymptotic conclusion of the classical jury theorem) follows from a recursion formula:

$$P_{n+2} = P_n + (2p - 1) \binom{n}{\frac{n+1}{2}} [p(1-p)]^{\frac{n+1}{2}}. \quad (9)$$

Indeed, since $\frac{1}{2} < p \leq 1$, the second term on the right hand side of 9 is non-negative (and positive if $p \neq 1$), so that $P_{n+2} \geq P_n$ (and $P_{n+2} > P_n$ if $p \neq 1$).

While the recursion formula 9 appears in the literature (e.g., Grofman et. al 1983), we cannot find a published derivation; let us therefore mention a simple combinatorial argument to its effect. We again conditionalize on a given problem $\pi \in \Pi$ and write p for the corresponding problem-specific competence p^π . Fix any odd group size n ($\in \{1, 3, \dots\}$). Recall that P_{n+2} is the (problem-conditional) probability of the event M_{n+2} that more than half of the first $n + 2$ votes is correct. This event can be partitioned into two subevents: the subevent $M_{n+2} \setminus M_n$ that more than half of the first $n + 2$ but fewer than half of the first n votes are correct, and the subevent $M_{n+2} \cap M_n$ that more than half of the first $n + 2$ and also more than half of the first n votes are correct. We can therefore decompose P_{n+2} into a sum:

$$P_{n+2} = \Pr(M_{n+2} \setminus M_n | \pi) + \Pr(M_{n+2} \cap M_n | \pi).$$

Here, the second term can in turn be rewritten as follows:

$$\Pr(M_{n+2} \cap M_n | \pi) = \Pr(M_n | \pi) - \Pr(M_n \setminus M_{n+2} | \pi) = P_n - \Pr(M_n \setminus M_{n+2} | \pi),$$

so that in summary

$$P_{n+2} = P_n + \Pr(M_{n+2} \setminus M_n | \pi) - \Pr(M_n \setminus M_{n+2} | \pi). \quad (10)$$

Now the event $M_{n+2} \setminus M_n$ implies that exactly $\frac{n+1}{2}$ of the first n votes (i.e., a narrow majority) must be incorrect – which happens with probability $\binom{n}{\frac{n+1}{2}} p^{\frac{n-1}{2}} (1-p)^{\frac{n+1}{2}}$

– while the next two votes must be correct – which happens with probability p^2 . By multiplication we therefore obtain that

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(M_{n+2} \setminus M_n | \pi) &= \binom{n}{\frac{n+1}{2}} p^{\frac{n-1}{2}} (1-p)^{\frac{n+1}{2}} p^2 \\ &= p \binom{n}{\frac{n+1}{2}} [p(1-p)]^{\frac{n+1}{2}}.\end{aligned}\tag{11}$$

Similarly, the event $M_n \setminus M_{n+2}$ of a correct majority among the first n but not among the first $n+2$ votes implies that exactly $\frac{n+1}{2}$ of the first n votes (i.e., a narrow majority) is correct – which has probability $\binom{n}{\frac{n+1}{2}} p^{\frac{n+1}{2}} (1-p)^{\frac{n-1}{2}}$ – while the next two votes are incorrect – which has probability $(1-p)^2$. Thus, again by multiplication,

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(M_n \setminus M_{n+2} | \pi) &= \binom{n}{\frac{n+1}{2}} p^{\frac{n+1}{2}} (1-p)^{\frac{n-1}{2}} (1-p)^2 \\ &= (1-p) \binom{n}{\frac{n+1}{2}} [p(1-p)]^{\frac{n+1}{2}}.\end{aligned}\tag{12}$$

Using expressions 11 and 12, we see that equation 10 implies the recursion formula 9.

Step 3. We now prove the theorem’s asymptotic conclusion. By Step 1 we have to find the limit as $n \rightarrow \infty$ of the expression 7. We first show that the subexpression $B_{n,p}((\frac{n}{2}, n])$ ($= P_n$) converges to one as $n \rightarrow \infty$. Recall that this expression is the probability that the sum of n independent and identically distributed Bernoulli-variables (which are 1 with probability p) belongs to the interval $(\frac{n}{2}, n]$. Equivalently, it is the probability that $\frac{1}{n}$ times this sum belongs to the interval $(\frac{1}{2}, 1]$. This probability converges to 1 as $n \rightarrow \infty$, by the law of large numbers and the fact that the interval $(\frac{1}{2}, 1]$ contains the mean p of each Bernoulli-variable.

By 7 and the just-shown fact that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} B_{n,p}((\frac{n}{2}, n]) = 1$,

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(M_n) &\rightarrow \sum_{p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]} \Delta(p) + \Gamma \\ &= \sum_{p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]} \Pr(p^\pi = p) - \sum_{p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]} \Pr(p^\pi = 1-p) + \Gamma \\ &= \Pr\left(p^\pi > \frac{1}{2}\right) - \Pr\left(p^\pi > \frac{1}{2}\right) + \Gamma \\ &= \Pr\left(p^\pi > \frac{1}{2}\right) + \frac{1}{2} \Pr\left(p^\pi = \frac{1}{2}\right).\end{aligned}$$

This limit is one if $\Pr(p^\pi > \frac{1}{2}) = 1$, and less than one otherwise.

Step 4. We finally show the theorem’s non-asymptotic conclusion by distinguishing between the three variants of the theorem defined in appendix A. (Although the first variant follows from the second, we also give a simple direct proof of the first variant.)

Variant (a). Here ‘tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ’ is defined in our first (weak) way. By Step 1 we have to show that expression 7 is weakly increasing in (odd) group size n . This

follows from the fact that Γ is a constant in n , $\Delta(p)$ is a non-negative constant (by New Competence with the current definition of tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$), and expression 8 is weakly increasing (by Step 2).

Variant (b). Here ‘tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ’ is defined in our second way (i.e., as a weak tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ *within* $(0, 1)$). Noting that for $p = 1$ we have $B_{n,p}(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n\right]) = 1$, expression 7 for the probability of majority correctness can be re-written as

$$\Pr(M_n) = \sum_{p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)} B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \Delta(p) + \Delta(1) + \Gamma.$$

Hence, since Γ and $\Delta(1)$ are constant in n , it suffices to show that the expression $\sum_{p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)} B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \Delta(p)$ is weakly increasing (in odd n). This is the case because for all $p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$, firstly, the coefficient $\Delta(p)$ is non-negative (by New Competence with the current notion of ‘tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ’) and, secondly, the coefficient $B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right)$ ($= P_n$) is strictly increasing by Step 2.

Variant (c). Here, ‘tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ ’ is defined in our third way (i.e., as a *strict* tendency to exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ *within* $(0, 1)$). To show that the probability of majority correctness is now even *strictly* increasing, we consider again the argument made for variant (b) and add that for some $p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ the coefficient $\Delta(p)$ is *strictly* positive, so that the sum $\sum_{p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)} B_{n,p} \left(\left(\frac{n}{2}, n \right] \right) \Delta(p)$ becomes *strictly* increasing. ■